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ARTICLES
FROM INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
TO INTERNET NORMS:
THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK
DISPUTES IN THE INTERNET AGE
MARCELO HALPERN* & AJAY K. MEHROTA*
1. INTRODUCTION
In today's dynamic, digital economy, there is a global clash be-
tween geographically bounded trademarks and the limitless reach of
the Internet. Trademark law, by definition, is premised on the princi-
ple of territoriality. The legal rights that give trademarks and other
forms of intellectual property economic value are circumscribed by
geography. The Internet, in contrast, knows no bounds. It is a vast
and expanding international network of interconnected computers
that is limited neither by space nor time.
Traditionally, discrepancies in international trademark rights have
been resolved through international treaties. Countries exercising
their national sovereignty have participated in time-consuming multi-
lateral state-to-state negotiations, with global harmonization as the
primary goal. Until recently, this conventional treaty approach has
been successful in developing a sense of global comity among the sig-
natories of various international agreements.
With the recent, incredible explosion of e-commerce, however,
such a traditional process has become economically obsolete. The
Internet's ability to provide information with unprecedented speed
and efficiency has turned many traditional modes of human interac-
" Partner, Gordon & Glickson LLC
Staff Attorney, Gordon & Glickson LLC Copyright 2000, Gordon & Glick-
son LLC Both authors would like to thank Lynn Strain for her assistance with this
article. All translations have been verified by the authors and not by the Unwsity of
Pazrs)twria Jornad temdoml E moonic Law
U. Pa..J. Int'l E c= L.
tion- legal and otherwise- into relics of bygone days. The conven-
tional process of harmonizing international differences in intellectual
property law is no different. In place of the traditional process, a new
approach towards international intellectual property is fast emerging-
one that rests not on treaties between multiple nation-states, but on a
type of "Internet Common Law" that privileges the private contracts
of individuals and the social norms of the cyberspace community.'
The development of an Internet Common Law has been acceler-
ated in the area of domain name disputes. As the functional addresses
of websites, domain names are a vital aspect of the stability and
growth of the Internet and e-commerce. This stability and growth has
been challenged recently by the conflicts between domain names and
trademarks. One type of conflict has been created by "cybersquat-
ters"- those who register domain names ahead of trademark owners
in the hope of securing a quick profit. The cybersquatters benefit by
negotiating to sell the rights to the domain name to the trademark
owner. Another more difficult set of conflicts comes from competing
but valid claims to trademarks that are used as domain names. The
international system established to resolve these conflicts- the Uni-
form Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("UDNDRP" or
"ICANN Policy") adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers ("ICANN")- is a prime example of how the
conventional method of multinational cooperation is being supplanted
by the new approach of individual consent and Internet norms.
This Article explores how this new approach of private ordering
and Internet norms operates in the arena of international trademark
disputes. The Internet, and the new economy it has spawned, has
collided with traditional notions of trademark law. Section 2 of this
Article surveys the wreckage of international trademark law that has
been left in the wake of this collision. This Section begins with a brief
background on the fundamentals of trademark law and the operation
of the domain name system. It then explores how the domain name
system, and the e-commerce it supports, have undermined traditional
notions of international trademark law. Section 3 of this Article ex-
amines how the Internet Common Law has developed thus far and
how it may be well suited, in spirit, to guide the resolution of interna-
I Legal theorists, most notably Lawrence Lessig, have discussed how common
law principles operate in cyberspace communities. See Lawrence Lessig, The Path jf
CQnbzq 104 YALE LJ. 1743 (1995). The present Article, however, suggests that the
Internet community has done more than borrow venerable common law principles;
the Internet has inculcated its own crude form of the common law.
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tional trademark and domain name disputes. ICAINN and its dispute
resolution policy have in many ways come to embody important as-
pects of this Internet Common Law. By analyzing the origins, key
elements, and limitations of this new international dispute resolution
policy, Section 4 investigates how the ICANN Policy adheres to, and
how it departs from, the spirit of the Internet Common Law. Using
the ICANN Policy as a case study, this Article contends that interna-
tional trademarks are only one aspect of a growing trend- fostered by
the Internet- away from top-down administration and towards a
more democratic, and perhaps even populist, mode of decision-
making.
2. THE INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK WRECKAGE:
WHEN THE INTERNET COLLIDED WITH
INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK LAW
2.1. Trademnk Basis
Throughout the world, trademarks have two primary functions.
First, they act as a signal to consumers, alerting them to the origins or
manufacture of specific goods! When consumers come to associate a
known mark with goods or services from a particular source, they
usually rely upon the mark as a signal of the quality of such goods and
services.3 Thus, trademarks are an essential part of developing a con-
sumer brand. Second, trademarks are important in protecting the
goodwill or consumer reputation of a company A trademark is how
a company identifies itself to potential customers. By investing re-
sources in its products and its mark, a company has a vested interest
in ensuring that consumers associate their mark with their quality
goods and services. Likewise, trademark owners want to make sure
that consumers are not deceived into purchasing inferior products that
may have a mark that is confusingly similar to their own. Trademark
owners, in other words, want to prevent competitors from "free rid-
ing" on the coattails of their efforts. Similarly, trademark owners do
not want inferior competing products to diminish or "dilute" the
2 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION S 2:6 (4th ed. 1997) [hereinafter MCCARTHY].
3 For the purposes of simplicity, this Article will use the terms "trademarks"
and "marks" synonymously to refer to both service marks and trademarks.
4 See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2:15.
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value of their products by altering the positive consumer image that is
associated with their mark'
As identifiers of the source of commercial goods and services,
trademarks are necessarily industry-specific and geographically limited.
In other words, trademark protection exists to prevent confusion over
the origins of particular products or services in a specific commercial
area. So long as there is no "likelihood of confusion," companies us-
ing the same mark can, and do, generally operate at the same time in
different industries or locations.' The "United" mark is a textbook
example of the industry-specific nature of trademark law. Both
United Van Lines and United Airlines have exclusive rights to their
respective marks, but because they offer different services, they coex-
ist without infringing upon each other's intellectual property rights.
Similarly, two companies that operate in the same line of business, but
cater to distinct and separate consumer markets, could have similar
marks, as long as the disparate locations of their markets could ensure
that there would be no confusion over the origins of their respective
goods and services!
2.2. The Dorramin Nanm Sjsten
Trademarks have played an important role throughout the history
of commerce, but the Internet's domain name system and the e-
commerce that has mushroomed around it have made trademarks
even more important. The domain name system is, in short, the in-
dexing method that defines each of the networks and computers that
make up the Internet. Computers connected to the Internet, and the
websites that are located on specific computer servers, are identified
by an unwieldy set of Internet protocol numbers that are often diffi-
cult to remember. Domain names function as a type of mnemonic, or
alias, that assists Internet users in finding particular websites. Domain
names are also a key element of the Uniform Resource Locators
("URL") needed to reach computers on the Internet.' The University
of Pennsylvania's home page, for example, is identified by the fol-
lowing set of Internet protocol numbers: 128.91.2.28. However, it is
5 William M. Ladnes & Richard A. Posner, The Ecwranrs of Tradeamrk Laq 78
TRADEMARK REP. 267 (1988).
6 SeMCCARTHY, supra note 2, % 26:1-4, 29:1-7.
7 Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 414-15 (1916).
8 For more on howthe domain name system works, see generallyELLENRONY
& PETER RONY, THE DOMAIN NAME HANDBOOK 1-136 (1998), explaining the
process of domain name registration as well as the system's benefits and drawbacks.
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much easier for an Internet user to remember that the domain name
upenn.edu will allow him or her to connect to the University's com-
puter. Plainly put, "a domain name is the simplest way of locating a
website."9
With the emergence of e-commerce, domain names have come to
be much more than mere Internet ddresses. They have become the
new trademarks for a new economy." Consumers have come to rely
upon domain names in much the same way as they rely on trademarks
in the tangible world; domain names are seen as symbols that identify
the source of particular products and services. Indeed, because the
Internet has so pervaded our current ways of communicating, it is not
unreasonable for an Internet user to associate a website or an e-mail
address that contains a tangible world trademark with the owner of
that mark When a computer user types in a specific URL or sends an
e-mail to an address that contains a well-known mark, the user rea-
sonably believes that she is accessing information provided by the
trademark owner or is communicating with the authorized agents of
the trademark owner.
Domain names differ, however, from traditional trademarks in at
least one highly significant way. Whereas traditional marks can coexist
at the same time in multiple locales or lines of business, domain
names cannot. Only one specific domain name can exist for each top-
level domain." For example, only one unique domain name can claim
the commercially lucrative .com suffix for its Internet address. While
in the tangible world United Airlines and United Van Lines can coex-
ist peacefully, in cyberspace only one of these businesses can claim
united.com. The scarcity of domain names, along with the first-come,
first-serve policy of domain name registration, has done much to ex-
acerbate the tensions between domain names and trademark law. 12
9 Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998).
10 See Susan Anthony, Dornuin Nane: The New Tradenurks, in TRADEMARK LAW
&THE INTRNET (Lisa E. Cristal &Neal S. Greenfield eds., 1999).
n Technically, a top-level domain is identified by the last group of two or three
letters in an Internet address. Currently, there is a limited set of generic top-level
domains that include .edu, .com, and .org, among others. Top-leve domain names
also include country identifiers such as .fr for France and .uk for the United King-
dor. ICANN is presently considering expanding the range of top-level domains.
See Carlos Grande, New Web Addrsses May Be Lata dNect Yer, FIN. TIMEs, July
17, 2000, at 3 (explaining that regulators voted for new Internet domain suffixes for
the first time in a decade).
12 For more on how the first-come, first-serve domain name registration policy
has affected trademark law, see Jessica Litman, The DNS Was: Tradaimrks ani the
IbenaDorinNarShtr4 4J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 149 (2000).
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2.3. The Terdoriality Tradition qfnImational Tradermrk Law
The conflict between domain names and trademark law has also
turned on the issue of territoriality. While domain names- as the new
trademarks-may serve some of the same purposes as traditional
trademarks, they do not operate under the same established principle
of territoriality. International law has had a long tradition of protect-
ing trademark rights in accordance with the territoriality doctrine.13
Long before the Internet, trademark protection was an essential part
of international trade. Globalization, despite being the shibboleth of
today's academic and business communities, is not a new phenome-
non. Goods and services have been exchanged across national
boundaries for centuries, and trademark protection has been, for the
most part, a universal concept with deep historical roots.14
Throughout this history, international trademark law has been de-
fined by geography. Intellectual property rights have been recognized
and enforced only within those nation-states that have clearly defined
the scope of their intellectual property protection. Worldwide trade-
marks do not exist; therefore, trademark owners cannot restrict the
use of their marks by others outside the borders of their home juris-
diction. Instead, trademark holders must ensure that their marks
qualify for protection under the domestic laws of the foreign jurisdic-
tions in which they plan to use their marks." To coordinate the dif-
ferent nation-state legal regimes, international organizations such as
the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") have admin-
13 See grrally Doris Estelle Long, The Teitorid Natue of hl 1 Proerty
Rits, in INTERNAIONAL INIELLECrUAL PROPERTY LAw 373, 374 (Anthony
D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long eds., 1997) (explaining the classical view of intellec-
tual property rights, according to which "the authority of a country granting intel-
lectual propertyprotection can only extend to its borders," and the impact of that
view on the business of authors and inventors of protected works in foreign coun-
tries) [hereinafter D'Amato &Long].
14 See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 2-6, at 2-11 (describing how all developed
cultures and economic systems have trademark protection policies). The chief treaty
governing international trademark law, the Nice Agreement Concerning the Inter-
national Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of
Marks, commonly referred to as the Paris Convention, was signed in the late nine-
teenth century. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar.
20, 1883, U.S.T. 1629. The Paris Convention was promulgated in 1883, adopted by
the United States in 1887, and implemented in the United States through domestic
legislation in 1903. See Michael V. LiRocchi et al., Tradenrks and Intent Donrin
Nams in the Digital Milmrwii 4 UCLA J. INTL L. & FOREIGN AFF. 377, 410
(1999/2000).
15 See MCCARTHY, sura note 2, S 29:1, at 29-4 (explaining that a trademark has
an individual legal existence under the laws of each country).
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istered a variety of treaties designed to harmonize a minimum level of
international intellectual property protection. Many of these treaties
obligate their signatories to extend national treatment to residents of
other states. National treatment ensures a level playing field by re-
quiring treaty adherents to grant an identical level of trademark pro-
tection for both foreign and domestic owners. Thus, a U.S. trademark
holder can usually receive protection in a foreign jurisdiction, if she
complies with that jurisdiction's trademark protection requirements
and if the United States and the foreign jurisdiction recognize mutual
rights through some sort of international agreement.16
2.4. The Dig ml C ig for the T aty Rewr jlntema ion Law
The Internet has broken down many of the geographical and tem-
poral premises of international law. As a communication tool, the
new technology has radically accelerated the speed and ease with
which individuals and institutions communicate with each other. This
has led to unprecedented gains in economic efficiency. Similarly, e-
commerce has revolutionized business models and practices. These
efficiency gains and new business paradigms have caused the current
state of international trademark law to become, at the very least, in-
consistent and at worst, incoherent.
2.4.1. E micEffidemy
The communication revolution wrought by the new technology
has rendered the time-consuming process of negotiating multinational
accords economically inefficient. The high transaction costs that ac-
company multilateral, and even bilateral, negotiations necessarily imply
that reaching a mutually acceptable agreement will require a great deal
of time and effort. The negotiations surrounding the North American
Free Trade Agreement and the Uruguay Round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") demonstrate that bro-
kering international agreements is an expensive and arduous proc-
ess- one that is frequently hampered by conflicting cultural nuances."
While harmonizing international regulatory differences is still an admi-
rable goal, the Internet has fostered a communication revolution-
16 See D'Amato & Long, supra note 13, at 373 (providing that protection in for-
eign jurisdictions is dependent on whether the inventor is "subject to patent protec-
tion and upon the scope of rights the domestic law grant[s] to a patent owner").
17 See Fiw4 the Trade Agreenr WASH PosT, Dec. 16, 1993, at A24; see also
LiRocchi et al., supra note 14, at 410 (stating that international accord requires look-
ing at cultural nuances and harmony of laws).
2000]
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complete with its own sense of decentralized, self-regulation- that
seems at odds with the multilateral treaty approach. On one level, the
Internet's effect on communication has made all forms of negotia-
tions, including those between nation-states, quicker, easier, and more
direct.
More importantly, the Internet has altered the relationship be-
tween individuals and their nation-states. With the Internet's ease of
direct and continuous contact, individual citizens have come to rely
less on their representative governments and more on coordinated
private action to address even large-scale problems."8 Avoiding the
bureaucracy of state action, Internet users have organized their own
self-help methods through newsgroups, e-mails, and chat-rooms.
These populist efforts toward self-regulation have required fewer re-
sources and have often led to more effective solutions. In fact,
ICANN's Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy embodies much
of this self-regulatory spirit of the Internet.
This does not mean to suggest, however, that international treaties
in general are no longer necessary. They still play a fundamental role
in opening markets and establishing international free-trade principles.
Moreover, while e-commerce is certainly a portent of the future, it
currently only makes up a small portion of international trade.19 Nev-
ertheless, in the specific area of trademark and domain name disputes,
the notion of relying on international accords to settle global discrep-
ancies is an outmoded idea that does not correspond with the dynamic
and swift nature of today's technology.
2.4.2. TheNewBusiness Mods cfE-Cm 'row
International trademark law has also been challenged by the emer-
gence of new e-business practices and models. Current international
trademark treaties and case law are premised on an antiquated busi-
ness model, which assumes that separate geographical markets are
18 The recent recall of Bridgestone/Firestone tires is a prime example of how
citizens throughout the world have used the Internet to share information and ad-
dress problems that have traditionally been handled by government agencies. See
Karen Lundgaard, The In,w Is ADyig a PiNral Rdle in Rmafalc gBetoW/FhoM
Titr, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16,2000, at 14.
19 See UN Repon UrW Dezdoping Capmte to Captre E-Ca Boorr; AGFRP,
Feb. 16, 2000, auai/able at 2000 WL 2734305 (predicting the value of online transac-
tions for this year to be approximately $377 billion dollars).
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distinct areas of commerce." For example, the Paris Convention-
the principal treaty governing the international treatment of trade-
marks- is founded on the notion that companies looking to expand
into new consumer markets must spend a great deal of effort and re-
sources in researching and then ultimately penetrating these new mar-
kets. Ratified in 1883, the Paris Convention is oblivious to the alacrity
and pervasiveness of e-commerce. The treaty, for instance, requires
member states to recognize unregistered foreign marks when the for-
eign mark is well known, not necessarily in the state of origin, but in
the locale where protection is sought.21 This provision not only fails
to contemplate the global reach of e-commerce, which has the poten-
tial to make nearly all markets local in nature, but more importantly,
this local knowledge requirement does little to avert potential domain
name disputes. Under this provision, a potential cybersquatter could
register a relatively unknown foreign trademark as a domain name and
possibly suffer no consequences. The local knowledge requirement
and other aspects of the Paris Convention demonstrate how the tradi-
tional trademark regime is clearly ill-equipped to deal with the prob-
lems of the twenty-first century.
2.5. Im naIm d Taties and Casdaw
More recent international agreements also have done little to ad-
dress the conflict between domain names and trademark law. In the
last few decades, GAIT has sought to establish international norms
for intellectual property agreements. As the name suggests, GATT
was initially conceived as an accord to enhance international com-
merce by reducing tariffs and other trade barriers. During the Uru-
guay Round of GATT in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, however, the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS") was established.' In many ways, the basic principles of
TRIPS parallel what is already contained in the Paris Convention. In
the context of trademarks and domain names, however, TRIPS pro-
vides added protection to trademark owners by broadening the notion
20 This logic also explains why trademark protection has historically been lim-
ited to the geographic area in which the mark owner conducts his or her commercial
activity.
21 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21
U.S.T. 1629, supra note 14, art. 4(A)(1).
22 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Dec.
15, 1993, Annex 1C LEGAL INSTUMENTS- RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND,
33 I.L.M. 81, 85 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
' 2000]
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of goodwill and by presuming that confusion is likely when a mark is
used for identical goods and services. Nevertheless, because TRIPS
was negotiated and instituted well before the development of e-
commerce, the potentially abusive practice of cybersquatting is not
addressed directly.
By contrast, the European Community's First Council Directive
(the "Directive") seems to have anticipated the problem of cyber-
squatting, though it takes only a limited step in tackling the issue.24
The Directive explicitly allows members to deny registration for "bad
faith," if the mark is used abroad. However, "bad faith" is only a nec-
essary condition. The Directive requires that registration be denied
only when both "bad faith" and a "likelihood of confusion" exist.25
Of course, in the context of domain name disputes, when the origi-
nator's mark is not well known in the European Union there is little
chance of confusion. Thus, despite the Directive, a cybersquatter
could be free to appropriate a foreign mark as part of a domain name.
Although international case law dealing with domain names and
trademarks has been more flexible and responsive than the laws codi-
fied in treaties, it has developed gradually and unevenly, proving that
there is indeed a need for a more stable, efficient, and transparent
system for resolving international disputes. In an emblematic case
concerning conflicting, yet valid, rights to a trademark used in a do-
main name, a U.K. court ruled that the first party to register and use
the trademark in the domain name was legally entitled to use the mark
as long as there was no likelihood of consumer confusion.26 In that
case, a U.S. manufacturer of sports equipment, the Prince Sports
Group, Inc., attempted to enjoin Prince plc, a British information
technology ("IT') company, from using the prince.com domain name.
The U.S. sporting goods manufacturer had valid trademark registra-
tions for "prince" in both the United States and the United Kingdom,
and the British IT company also had valid common-law rights in the
United Kingdom to use the same "prince" mark. Prior to the Inter-
net, the two companies, with their two distinct products and services,
coexisted peacefully. However, when the U.S. sporting goods com-
pany sought to register prince.com as a domain name, it was surprised
to learn that the U.K. IT company had already registered the domain
23 Id art. 16(C); see also LiRocchi et al., supra note 14, at 389 (demonstrating that
TRIPS is one of the international agreements relevant to trademark issues).
24 Council Directive 89/104/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L40) 1.
25 Sw id art. 4(3).
26 Prince plc v. Prince Sports Group Inc., 1998 FLEET ST. REP. 21 (Ch. 1997).
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names prince.com and prince.co.uk. The US. company sent a cease-
and-desist letter threatening further legal action if the U.K. company
did not transfer the domain name to the U.S. company. In response,
the UK. company brought an action for declaratory relief in London's
High Court and deposited the domain names with the U.K. Court
pending final decision. Relying on the theory of "first-in-time," the
U.K. Court ruled in favor of the U.K. company. The court reasoned,
first, that since domain names are registered on a first-come, first-
serve basis, the U.K. company was the first organization to officially
establish its valid trademark as a domain name. Second, and more
importantly, the court reasoned that because the businesses of the two
parties clearly were distinct, there was no likelihood of confusion.
In the context of explicit cybersquatting, most international
courts, like U.S. courts, have rebuked attempts to extort trademark
owners' rights. Courts in the Netherlands, for instance, not only have
ruled against typical cybersquatters, they also have acknowledged that
domain names within the top level of .com carry greater commercial
value than other domain names.2  In La dchew u 1MG HodJana a
Dutch court ruled that cybersquatters could be liable for trademark
infringement even if the trademarks at issue could still be registered in
a domain name other than .comr. The court reasoned that consumers
would still be confused by the squatters' .com website- even if it
contained limited disclaimers.
These cases and others like it point to a growing trend among in-
ternational and domestic courts. This trend discourages cybersquat-
ting and supports the theory of first-in-time for those with valid but
competing trademark claims. This tendency also shows how case law,
because of its flexibility, is superior to treaties in dealing with the dy-
namic issue of domain name disputes. Like international treaties,
however, international case law is jurisdiction-specific; it too is bound
by geography. In this sense, regulation of domain name disputes re-
quires a new approach that corresponds with the communication
speed and economic efficiency of the Internet itself. ICANN's Uni-
form Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy is a valiant first effort
toward such a new approach. Despite its merits, ICANN's Policy is
not without its limitations. Both the virtues and the drawbacks of
ICANN's Policy can be judged in light of how well the Policy corre-
sponds to the Internet Common Law that has helped give it life.
27 Labourchere v. IMG Holland, President District Court, Amsterdam, May 15,
1997 RvdW 193.
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3. THE INTERNET COMMON LAW:
A NEWAPPROACH FORA NEW ECONOMY
Like the judge-made common law that has guided Anglo-
American jurisprudence for centuries, the Internet Common Law is a
flexible regime of rules and regulations that is based mainly on Inter-
net custom and common usage. In the last few years, there has been a
robust debate among legal scholars and practitioners about how law
functions on the Internet. The idea of an Internet Common Law fits
squarely within this debate. On one side of the dispute are those who
argue that because the Internet is such a novel and revolutionary
technology, it requires a radical paradigm shift in legal analysis." Oth-
ers contend that, while the Internet is certainly a new technology, it
still adheres to familiar legal concepts.29 This Article argues that, in
the specific context of international trademark and domain name dis-
putes, the Internet should be approached and respected as a unique
place with its own set of social norms and community standards.
Complete self-regulation, however, is not the solution. This Article
takes the normative position that, on the contrary, international
trademark and dornain name disputes should be governed by a quasi-
public institution that respects the Internet norms of private contracts
and populist authority.
3.1. Inemet Norr: Prite m&racts and Ppulist Authority
The social norms and community standards that guide the Inter-
net Common Law are not metaphysical ideals handed down by some
Supreme Being. Rather, they are socially-constructed values that have
evolved gradually over time, like other conventions embedded in a
culture's social relations. One of the strongest social norms that has
emerged is a reliance on decentralized private ordering. The Internet
is, first and foremost, a dynamic technology. To keep pace with the
dizzying escalation of technological change, Internet users have
yearned for a flexible way to channel social behavior. There is per-
haps no better way to inculcate flexibility into a rule-making system
28 Among the many authors who have argued that the Internet calls for a dra-
matic change in legal principles, two of the most notable are David Post and David
Johnson. See David . Johnson & David Post, LawardBordm- The Rise ofLaw in
CQ)&spae 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367 (1996).
29 At the extreme end of this position are scholars who argue that there is no
such thing as cybespace law. SeeFrank l Easterbrook, CQe and theLawftbe
Hose, 1996 U. cHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996).
[Vol121:3
INTL TRADEMARKDISPUTES
than to allow affected parties to engage in their own contractual ar-
rangements.
3.1.1. Pizute Contracts
Indeed, private contracts have become one of the hallmarks of the
Internet. From the contracts we sign with our Internet Service Pro-
viders ("ISPs"), to the shrink-wrapped licenses we agree to when pur-
chasing software, to the privacy policies we consent to when visiting
our favorite websites, private ordering has become the dominant form
of modem social relations. The metaphor of contracts is part of our
everyday culture on and offline, but on the Web, agreements between
consenting private parties have taken On added meaning. Unlike in
the tangible world, where contracts are usually the culmination of
face-to-face relations, agreements in cyberspace are often the only
nexus between distant and anonymous parties. We may not person-
ally know the online retailer from whom we purchase our books,
flowers, and .toys. However, by exchanging our credit card numbers
for their goods and services, we are constantly engaging in a set of
overlapping private agreements- agreements that govern such varied
issues as the confidentiality of the information we provide and the
guarantee that our goods will arrive on time. As e-commerce has
come to dominate our consciousness- if not our buying habits- this
reliance on decentralized economic and legal decision-making has be-
come a common feature of Internet behavior.
This, of course, does not mean that there is no place for more
centralized institutional support in the development of Internet stan-
dards. Cyberspace is not the political theorist's "state of nature."3"
The private ordering that has come to dominate the Internet is prem-
ised on the underlying support of the state and other quasi-public in-
stitutions, such as ICANN. Government agencies responsible for
consumer protection, for example, still play an essential role in defin-
ing and enforcing the default rules of all businesses, including e-
commerce. To have any meaning, contracts- whether they are made
in atomic space or cyberspace- must rely upon these background
rules.
30 The "state of nature," a hypothetical scenario conjured by seventeenth cen-
tury philosopher Thomas Hobbes, imagined what life was like before any govern-
ment was created. See Alain De Botton, TheA rts: Wo's in (aange?, DAILY TEL., June
28, 1997, at 12.
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3.1.2. PopzdistAuthcity
While these default rules are important for the private contracting
aspect of Internet norms, the appeal to judicial or legislative authority
is generally not part of the Internet culture. Rather, the Internet
community often turns to grass-roots, extra-legal self-help methods to
resolve online issues. By coordinating individual Internet users on a
large-scale basis, consumer advocates have been able to circumvent
many established legal institutions in favor of a more bottom-up type
of activism. A reliance on populist forms of authority, or what may
be called "peer pressure with a stick," has thus emerged as another
type of Internet norm.
There may be no better example of such online populist authority
than the evolution of website privacy policies. In the early stages of e-
commerce, many websites did not provide detailed information re-
garding how they would subsequently use the personal data gathered
from their visitors and customers. Indeed, privacy policies themselves
were quite rare during the early days of e-commerce. However, when
certain sites violated the trust of their visitors, other leading sites de-
veloped privacy policies as a competitive, commercial advantage. It
was not long before Internet users came to expect some sense of pri-
vacy and confidentiality in the information that they provided. As a
result, online privacy policies soon lost their function as a competitive
edge and became a cost of entry for any new site. The new Internet
norm became quite clean no privacy policy means no visitors and no
advertisers.
A similar type of populist authority emerged when website op-
erators transgressed well-established expectations of privacy and con-
fidentiality. Consider, for example, how Internet users reacted to a
potential change in privacy policies at America Online ("AOL"). In
the summer of 1997, AOL, the dominant international ISP, notified
its approximately 8.5 million customers that it was planning to alter a
provision in the company's service agreement. Apparently, AOL had
recently become aware of the lucrative potential of sharing with other
marketing companies the personal information that AOL gathered
from its users. AOL wanted to change the terms of its service agree-
ment so that it could reveal certain user information to interested
business entities. AOL users did not take the possible change in pol-
icy lightly. A bottom-up response to this unilateral corporate decision
began to percolate, as the media, AOL chat groups, and community
bulletin boards circulated the news. Within hours after the news of
the possible change had surfaced, AOL was deluged with a virtual
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avalanche of consumer protest e-mails and telephone calls. In a mat-
ter of days, the company was forced to reverse its position.31
Even outside the realm of online privacy, populist authority on the
Internet has been exercised with dramatic force. For several years,
self-appointed administrators of Internet newsgroups have been issu-
ing Usenet "Death Penalt[ies]" against unresponsive ISPs. 2 Since at
least 1997, individual users of Internet newsgroups have been working
together in a loose coalition to regulate abusive postings to news-
groups. In an effort to curb unsolicited newsgroup postings, com-
monly known as "spain," these self-appointed regulators cancel abu-
sive messages and block postings that originate from indifferent
ISPs. 3
3
Technically, any member of a newsgroup or electronic bulletin
board can cancel or delete spain. However, issuing a Death Penalty,
which promises to block all further postings from a specific ISP, is a
much harsher penalty that usually requires some consensus within the
newsgroup community. Indeed, newsgroup users have developed
general guidelines as to what constitutes spain and what can be done
to halt it. Generally, when spam from a particular ISP begins to flood
a newsgroup, members will notify the ISP of the problem. It is only
when the ISP does not respond to the community outcry that the
Usenet Death Penalty is issued as a last resort.
For example, in December of 1999, a group of Usenet participants
proposed a Usenet Death Penalty against Excite@Home when the
participants determined that a large amount of span was originating
from Excite@Home servers. The California-based ISP was only able
to avert the capital punishment when it reconfigured its internal ar-
chitecture to filter such postings and assured the Usenet community
that it would take steps to educate its members.34 Excite@Home is
just one of many ISPs that has been forced to implement anti-
spanming measures as a response to Usenet Death Penalties.
The peer pressure that has come to represent the Internet Com-
mon Law also played a role in resolving at least one trademark and
31 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, A OL Car ds Planfor Tdemrker. Discsure ofMen'
NunhwProtest, WASR POST, July25,1997, at G1.
32 Corey Grice & Jim Hu, Excit@Horm Usnt Death Peiy LW GNET
News, at http://nev.cnet.com/news/0- 1004-200-1526165.htmA (Jan. 18, 2000) (de-
fining the term Usenet Death Penalth.
33 Id
34 Id (describing the methods used byExcite@Home to avert a Usenet Death
Penalty.
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domain name dispute. In a conflict between a U.S. online toy store
with the domain name etoys.com and a European site for digital art-
ists with the domain name etoy.com, Internet community pressure
was instrumental in resolving the dispute. In September 1999, the on-
line retailer, eToys.com, filed a trademark infringement and unfair
competition lawsuit against the registrants of etoy.com, after custom-
ers of the toy store, -who had mistakenly visited the artistic website,
complained about the provocative nature of some of the digital art
displays. Although the Swiss-based art site had registered its etoy do-
main name in 1995, two years before the online toy store got its do-
main name, a California Superior Court issued a preliminary injunc-
tion against etoy, shutting down the artists' website. Though the toy
seller had registered its trademark first, etoy claimed that it had a right
to the mark as a result of its earlier use of the mark in commerce.
Soon after the injunction was issued, and well before the case was re-
solved, a huge groundswell of online protest against the publicly-
traded e-commerce toy seller ensued. Angry e-mails were fired off to
the Santa Monica, California headquarters of eToys.com; several anti-
eToys websites were established, criticizing the toy retailer for its cor-
porate bullying; community chat rooms became clogged with protest
messages that rallied more support for the artists; and cyberspace sit-
ins were staged, as Internet users flooded the eToys.com site with bo-
gus orders. The artists themselves filed their own lawsuit and
launched a site at toywar.com to protest what they viewed as the re-
verse domain name hijacking of their website?5
Within a few months, the toy seller responded to Internet com-
munity pressure by negotiating a settlement with the conceptual art-
ists. Initially, the e-commerce company, which was valued at ap-
proximately $6 billion at the time,36 attempted to buy out the artists'
domain name rights." When that measure failed, the toy seller sought
a settlement that would give them limited control over the content of
the iconoclastic art site. After the artists rejected such censorship, the
two parties eventually reached an agreement whereby both sides
35 Richard Leiby, ETojs zs. EtoyA CTzsh efConmteardAr, WASH. POST, Dec.
10, 1999, at El.
36 Id
37 See Patricia Jacobus, eTojs Seeks Sat/wmr in Dipute ith etoy, CNET News,
(Dec. 29, 1999), at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1007-200-1509522.htm1 (last vis-
ited Sept. 26, 2000).
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dropped their respective lawsuits, and the toy seller agreed to pay the
art group's legal fees and other related expenses.38
The etoy victory vividly illustrates how Intemet users have har-
nessed the power of new technology to challenge even large-scale
commercial interests. Indeed, by connecting like-minded users,39 the
Internet has empowered individuals in nearly every aspect of their
lives. As consumers, Web surfers have become much more than pas-
sive receivers, or abstract demographic targets, of mass-market adver-
tisers. With power in numbers, Internet consumers have forced the
market to acquiesce to their demands, especially with regard to their
privacy concerns.
Similarly, as employees, intranet4 users have broken down much
of the hierarchy of the conventional co rporation. The sullen days of
Whyte's "Organization Man"' have been replaced by today's euphoric
moments of knowledge sharing. The topdown corporate memo has
been supplanted by the bottom-up intranet. Precisely because the
Internet and intranets connect people to each other and empower
them through these connections, the pace 'and quality of human dis-
course has radically changed. This greater flow of knowledge has de-
creased the friction between private parties, allowing for greater pri-
vate contracting. At the same time, it has also challenged the
bureaucratic hierarchy that has for so long subjugated consumers and
employees. In sum, the new technology and the Internet Common
Law it has fostered have rejuvenated indvidual choice and democratic
decision-making 2
Yet, if private contracts and populist authority are two of the cen-
tral norms embodied in the Internet Common Law, the question re-
mains: why is the Internet Common Law, and not some other
method of regulation, best suited to address the issue of international
trademark and domain name disputes? In determining trademark
38 See Patricia Jacobus, eTujs Sem5 Net Nan-- Dipte &th etoy, CNET Nevi, (Jan.
25, 2000), at http://nevv.cnet.com/news/0-1007-200-1531854.htrr1 (last visited
Sept. 26, 2000).
39 It may be more accurate to state that the Intemet has helped create the like-
minded, as well as bring the already like-minded folks together.
40 An intranet is a network of self-contained computers that are usually delim-
ited within an organization. MICHAEL D. SCOTr, INTMiNET AND TECHNOLOGY
LAWDESK REFERENCE 279 (1999).
41 'MLuAMI- W-IYT,JR, THE ORGANIZATIONMAN (1972).
42 See g3raly RiCK LEVINE ET AL., THE CLUETRAINMANIFESTO: THE END OF
BuSINESS AS USuAL (2000) (discussing the Intemet and its impact on the modem
World).
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rights on the Internet, why should deference be given to private con-
tracts and populist authority?
In some ways, the Internet Common Law is not particularly well
suited to govern trademark and domain name disputes. The eToys
example may, in this case, be the exception rather than the rule. The
Internet Common Law works best in those areas where novel issues
arise from the everyday operations of e-commerce. Online privacy
policies are the best example of how private contracts and coordinated
consumer pressure can shape the rules and regulations of cyberspace.
One reason why the Internet Common Law has been so effective in
the context of online consumer rights may be that e-commerce has
developed sui generis, in the absence of direct government regulation.
Website privacy policies were not mandated by any government
agency, but rather developed indigenously over time as a response to
individual consumer concerns. In contrast, the government has been
involved in trademark law and domain name registration from the be-
ginning of the Internet. The state has had a significant role in man-
aging how domain names are assigned and in policing trademark vio-
lations. Thus, there has been less opportunity for individual decision-
making and group pressure.
The limited number of domain names is another reason why the
Internet Common Law does not function as effectively in resolving
trademark and domain name conflicts. Online consumer rights are
furthered by individual decisions and group pressure, which are not
limited by any such constraint. E-commerce exists to satisfythe needs
and desires of consumers. Thus, individual consumers can withhold
their consent to website agreements and appeal to populist authority
to force Internet companies to meet their demands. The preservation
of online privacy policies, for example, is not usually accomplished
through zero-sum solutions. Consumer demands for privacy can be
met without significantly harming website owners.
By contrast, domain names are limited to the generic top-level
domains that currently exist. In a conflict between two valid and
competing rights to a .com address, only one party can prevail. Either
United Van Lines or United Airlines, but not both, will be able to
claim united.com as its domain name 3 The company that obtains
rights to such a URL necessarily benefits at the expense of the other
legitimate trademark holder. Unlike consumer rights, trademark and
43 Indeed, United Airlines has registered the domain name united.com as its
Internet address.
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domain name disputes are very much a zero-sum game- one side
gains while the other loses.
The scarcity of top-level domain names and the significant gov-
ernment regulation of trademarks and the domain name system illus-
trate the limits of the Internet Common Law. Nevertheless, the spirit
of the Internet Common Law cannot be ignored, even in the context
of international trademarks and domain names. Indeed, as the eToys
controversy demonstrates, online populist authority is a force to be
reckoned with. Any stable, efficient, and long-lasting solution to the
tension between trademarks and domain names will need to acknowl-
edge the power of individual consent and populist authority. That is
why the Internet Common Law should be viewed not as an air-tight
system of rules and regulations but as an approximate guide for how
trademark and domain name disputes should be handled.
3.2. The Intemet Convn Lawand lmem6d Tradmrk
andDomain Nam Disputes
There are at least two main reasons why a solution to trademark
and domain name disputes should correspond to the Interet Com-
mon Law. These reasons are based on the principles of (1) flexibility
and certainty, and (2) functionality. First, a dynamic, evolving tech-
nology requires a system of governance that is both flexible and pre-
dictable. Second, because the Internet functions mainly as a relatively
easy-to-use communication device- albeit an unprecedented one- it
calls for a legal regime that operates on a similarly intuitive level of
human communication.
3.2.1. Flxibil y and Ctainty
It is important to remember that the Internet is not a monolithic
technology, but rather a network of layered applications.4 For most
computer users, the Internet comes in various manifestations, from e-
mail to newsgroups to the World Wide Web. Many of these applica-
tions have developed over time, as the Internet itself has evolved.
Several years ago, not even the most prescient of technology experts
could have predicted that the Internet would rise from such humble
military and academic roots to create the current e-commerce innova-
44 S&- Timothy Wu, Appicatio- d Inet Anjsis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163,
1164 (1999) (explaining further that legally important issues concerning the Interet
do not stem from basic Intemet protocols; ather, they are a function of the par-
ticular application).
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tions. In order for such a dynamic technology to continue to develop,
it must remain relatively free from static and confining sets of rules
and regulations.
The need for a flexible system of rules is not, however, unique to
the Internet. All laws struggle with the conflicting needs for flexibility
and certainty. On the one hand, the law requires detailed and specific
rules that address particular contexts in order to insure that like cases
will have like outcomes.45 On the other hand, the law seeks to avoid a
cumbersome multiplicity of different rules for different situations, so
that it is malleable and general enough to apply to a variety of situa-
tions. This general tension in legal theory between flexibility and pre-
dictability is even more pronounced in the context of Internet govern-
ance because computer technology is such a dynamic phenomenon.
The Internet's vitality has led many legal commentators to argue that
flexibility should trump certainty and predictability in the context of
online legal issues. For these scholars, the solution to Intemet-related
legal problems lies not with legislatures and judges, but with the indi-
viduals who are the direct participants in the cyberspace community.
Analogizing to the medieval Law Merchant, some commentators have
argued that the first step in addressing an Internet legal issue should
be to do nothing, to allow the cyber-participants to work out their
own problems, with their own customary solutions.46
Such a laissez-faire approach, however, ignores the social aspects
of cyberspace, and belies the network of cmtaid computers that is the
Internet. There are no entirely self-engaging acts on the Internet or
otherwise. Certainly, private contracts are more flexible than statutes
or judicial precedents, but they do not account for the adverse effects
on third parties, what economists call negative externalities or "exter-
nal diseconomies."4" Private parties left to their own volition may in-
deed come to mutually agreed upon positions- if they can overcome
45 The need for predictability has been a defining aspect of law for many legal
theorists. As Holmes wrote over a century ago, "The prophecies of what the courts
will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are whit I mean by the law." Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path jtheLau; 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897). For a more
recent analysis of the need for predictability in the law, see Frederick Schauer, Pmk.
tionariPartiuarity, 78 B.U. L. REV. 773 (1998).
4 Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legad Regm for "Cgyhspa, 55 U. PiTr. L. REV.
993, 1019-21 (1994) (comparing the development of customs governing transactions
in cyberspace to the Law Merchant, a set of customary practices which became a
practical, flexible, and expedient means of resolving disputes between merchants
that functioned independently of other bodies of law).
47 PAUL SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 477 (10th ed. 1976).
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the transaction costs of bargaining- but such agreements will give lit-
tle solace to parties' who are adversely affected by, and not privy to,
the private contracts. Moreover, the Internet is, in many ways, still in
its infancy. Like other innovative technologies before it, the Internet
and e-commerce will continue to need-stable and reliable regulations
to grow.48 Privileging flexibility over predictability may, ultimately, do
more harm than good for this growing technology.
For international trademark and domain name disputes, concern
for adverse third party effects and the future of e-commerce makes
pure self-regulation an even less viable option. Despite the early ex-
plosive growth of e-commerce, companies and consumers alike are
still experimenting with the full effects of purchasing online. The po-
tential of e-commerce remains untapped. To ensure that companies
will be adequately rewarded for their investments, and that consumers
will remain satisfied with their online buying experiences, trademark
law must be predictable. It is unlikely that private contracts, without
any further institutional regulation, can guarantee such predictability.
Similarly, for e-commerce to flourish, it is essential that consumers
have trust and confidence -in online retailers. Private agreements
about how trademarks will be used in domain names will need to be
sensitive to such-consumer needs. Trademarks, of course, exist to as-
sist consumers in their buying decisions, and in this regard private
parties have an incentive to insure that the proper signal is given. But
it is also possible that consumer interests will not be the first priority
of private companies negotiating an agreement over trademark rights.
To ensure that consumers will be protected from confusion over
trademarks and domain names, some sort of overarching authority is
necessary. In the end, the fate of e-commerce will rest on the careful
balance between the differing interests of consumer protection and
property rights.
The Internet, therefore, cannot be left only to the individual inter-
ests of private parties; it is too important a part of our social culture to
allow it to be a quasi-laboratory for the Coase theorem.49 Instead, cy-
berspace legal issues, such as domain name disputes, should be ad-
48 Throughout American legal history, law has played an instrumental role in
guiding new technology and fostering economic expansion during formative eras.
Se -a!!y MORTON HOR\WIz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-
1860 (1977) (studying the relationship between private law and economic change in
the nineteenth centur ; J. WLLARDHURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROwr-: THE
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WSCONSIN, 1836-1915 (1964)
(chronicling the role of regulators in the rise of the Wisconsin lumber industr).
49 SeeRonald H Coase, TheProbaimcfSoda1 Cost 3 J.L. &ECON. 1(1960).
20001
U. Pa. J. Int'I E con L.
dressed by some type of intermediate authority that respects the vital-
ity of the Internet and the flexibility of private contracts and is at the
same time sensitive to effects on the community and the need for
certainty. The Internet Common Law is a flexible yet predictable re-
gime attuned to the needs of the community;, therefore, some form of
intermediate authority that has a basis in the Internet Common Law
may be the best solution to many of the novel legal issues of cyber-
space, including the international dispute over trademarks and domain
names.
3.2.2. F tiadity
The functional aspects of domain names are a second reason why
some form of the Internet Common Law should govern trademark
and domain name disputes. Domain names make up the backbone of
the Internet. As website identifiers, they are heuristic devices that ap-
peal to human intuition. The Internet, however, was not always or-
ganized by domain names. Back in its earliest stages of development,
-when it was known simply as the ARPANET, computers connected
to the network were identified only by their Internet Protocol ad-
dresses, the long string of numbers that facilitated contact between
computers. Not until Jon Postel, one of the early technical architects
of the Internet, and his colleagues at the University of California, as-
signed "nicknames" for these Internet Protocol addresses, did domain
names come into being. The early domains were created primarily to
help direct communication traffic. Separate computers administered
each domain, and the "root serve?' directed traffic among the do-
mains.50
As the Internet developed beyond its military and academic roots,
domain names took on greater importance. Today, not only are they
the trademarks of a new economy, but they are also cultural icons.
From billion dollar initial public offerings, to incessant online and off-
line marketing of websites, to routine inclusion of hyperlinks in our
everyday e-mails, a dot-corn mentality has pervaded our cultural con-
sciousness. Domain names have assumed this added economic, so-
cial, and cultural significance precisely because they are intuitive.
Common sense Internet usage has developed to the point where many
people reasonably assume that a well-known trademark is represented
by a .corn location: one has come to reason that if something exists in
50 See Joseph P. Liu, Le nu ani A thooty in Inter Coonatior A Dormin
Narm Case Stu, 74 IND. Lj. 587, 591 (1999).
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the tangible world, it must exist in cyberspace as well. Thus, in a
highly consumer-conscious culture, such as our own, we can expect
individuals to believe that the trademarks and images ingrained in their
minds are in fact connected with the websites that contain these
marks.
A technology so indebted to human intuition calls for a legal sys-
tem that is equally as grounded in common sense. For many non-
experts, however, the law is a rarefied world of technical processes
and esoteric terminology. Whether it is the appellate process or re-
cently enacted legislation, many of the particulars of law remain far
removed from the everyday thinking of ordinary people and typical
Internet users. Sociolegal research on the U.S. system of litigation has
demonstrated that those who benefit most from the law are not "one-
shotters" or individual litigants but rather institutional "repeat players"
who have the human and financial capital to navigate through the legal
system's complicated channels.5 '
In contrast, the Internet Common Law is based on common sense
customs and usage. The appeal to populist authority is a vivid illus-
tration of how formal legal procedures have been surpassed by more
customary forms of consumer pressure, so too is the paramount con-
cern for online privacy. Although established forms of authority, such
as government agencies, have at times intervened on behalf of private
Internet users, the online right to privacy developed organically into
what is now a cherished cyberspace custom. Internet users have pres-
ently come to expect that the personal information they provide to
websites will remain private and confidential, regardless of the finan-
cial future of the sites.52
Similarly, the Internet community has developed its own set of
rules regarding online courtesy, commonly known as "netiquette."5 3
As a method of maintaining social order, netiquette does not govern
online communication through any centralized enforcement mecha-
51 SeeMarc Galanter, Why the "Have" Com ota A hazd" Speadatiom on the L iits ef
Legd! CJ3aru 9 LAW & SOC'YREv. 95, 97 (1974) (discussing that the structure of the
American legal system can be used to effect redistributive change).
52 Several failed e-commerce companies recently caught the attention of con-
sumer advocacy groups and the Federal Trade Commission when they sold cus-
tomer data in contradiction of their privacy policies. See ra!!y Greg Sandoval,
Faied Dot-Co May Be Sd/ing Your Prhnte kfonrtion. CNET News, at http://nevws.
cnet.com/news/0-1007-200-2176430.htrl (June 29, 2000) (reporting on three fi-
nancially troubled companies that have sold or are trying to sell customer informa-
tion).
53 VIRGINIASHEA, NETIQUETrE 20 (Seth Ross ed., Albian Books 1994).
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nism- in other words, there is no netiquette police. Rather, neti-
quette, like ordinary etiquette, functions as a form of underlying cul-
tural control. Members of a cyberspace community adhere to these
unwritten rules because they play a critical role in keeping communi-
cations stable, fair, and frictionless. For example, netiquette's discour-
agement of "flame wars"- a series of angry e-mails or group postings
exchanged between members of an online newsgroup or commu-
nity- helps maintain the camaraderie and mutual respect of discus-
sion groups. Although occasional "flames," or angry postings, are tol-
erated (and sometimes even encouraged), all-out "flame vas" are
viewed as egotistical and boring displays of immaturity that are ulti-
mately nothing more than "an unfair monopolization of bandwith."'4
Netiquette, the development of a grass-roots authority, and the pas-
sion for online privacy are all examples of how the Internet has
evolved pragmatically to develop indigenous responses to functional
issues.
This pragmatic aspect of the Internet, evidenced by its willingness
to allow for the development of internal, functional customs, is per-
haps the main reason why some institutional derivation of Internet
Common Law would be best suited to handle trademark and domain
name disputes. Any solution to the international problem of trade-
mark and domain name disputes must be cognizant of the intuitive
nature of the Internet. International treaties with subtle legal points
cannot satisfy the common sense functionalism of the Internet, nor
can they appeal intuitively across cultural borders. Likewise, judicial
decisions, based on the diverse legal processes of different jurisdic-
tions, can only resolve momentary tensions of conflicts. Judges can-
not provide large-scale, cosmopolitan solutions needed to keep the
Internet and e-commerce moving along at their current exponential
rate of growth. Instead, another medium is necessary to resolve the
tensions in trademark and domain names disputes; a third way be-
tween international accords and judicial decisions that will insure the
intuitive and structural integrity of the Internet is required. The
ICANN Policy is in many ways an example of such a third way.
4. ICANN's UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME
DISPUTE RESOLUTIONPOLCY: A CASE STUDY
As an institution, ICANN has its roots in the diverse communities
that make up the Internet. Created in 1998, at the prodding of the
54 Id at 43.
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U.S. Department of Commerce, ICANN consists of a broad coalition
of business leaders, technical advisers, academics, and other Internet
users. While the organization's responsibilities remain rather general,
one of its primary duties has been "to coordinate the technical man-
agement of the Internet's domain name system." 5 To further this
goal, ICANN has implemented one of its most significant policy
achievements: the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(the "Policy"). 6 However, before one can objectively analyze the ef-
fectiveness of the Policy- that is, whether or not it adheres to the un-
derlying principles of Internet Common Law- one must first under-
stand how the Policy came into being.
4.1. Policy Ori ns
The origins of ICANN's Policy are in many ways a culmination of
several earlier attempts to address the proper administration of the
domain name system. From the 1998 U.S. Green Paper5" that spurred
the need for ICANN, to the institutional support provided by the
World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"), the ICANN
Policy has evolved from a government policy statement to one of the
most significant institutional achievements of the Internet.
Prior to ICANN, the domain name registration process was ad-
ministered by only one company, Network Solutions Inc. ("NSI"), a
private U.S. corporation based in Herndon, Virginia. In 1992, as part
of a cooperative agreement with the U.S. National Science Founda-
tion, NSI was given a monopoly on domain name registration. 8 As
the entity solely responsible for administering generic top-level do-
main names, NSI quickly became embroiled in conflicts over domain
name and trademark rights5 9 In response, from 1995 through 1998,
NSI issued several versions of its domain name resolution policy. Ac-
cording to these policies, NSI would place on "hold" those domain
55 ICANN Fact Sheet, at http://www.icann.org/general/fact-sheet.htm (last
modified Mar. 25, 2000).
56 ICANN Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at http://www.
icann.org/udip/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (implementation documents approved
Oct. 24, 1999).
57 Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses,
63 Fed. Reg. 8826 (Proposed Feb. 20, 1998) (to be codified at 15 QFR. pt. 23)
[hereinafter Green Paper].
58 G. Peter Albert, Jr., Eninnt Dormin Nane: The Strude to Gain Conrd of de
IneeDorin Nar Ssten 16J. COMPUrER& INFO. L. 781 (1998).
59 See Dan Goodin, NSIs Liability in Tradermrk Disputes Ra*m CNET News,
(Apr. 29, 1999), at http://ne-ws.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-341869.html.
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names under issue, until a court of competent jurisdiction handed
down a decision.' In defense of its policies, NSI argued that it was
remaining neutral by freezing controversial domain names until the
parties resolved their differences through conventional litigation.
In reality, however, NSI's policy of placing domain names on hold
did not satisfy either trademark holders or domain name owners.61
Trademark holders complained that because NSI suspended only
those domain names that were identical to registered marks, confus-
ingly similar domain names remained exempt. Domain name holders
were equally displeased. They argued that NSI's policy extended
trademark rights beyond those accorded to mark holders in the tangi-
ble world. Domain name holders contended that NSI's policy would
harm those companies that used domain names for businesses that
bore no resemblance to the registered trademark use. 2
In response to these and other criticisms, the Clinton administra-
tion issued a policy statement in 1998 to re-evaluate the Internet do-
main name system.63 This initial draft did not contain a policy to re-
solve domain name and trademark disputes, but a subsequent and
more comprehensive statement, dubbed the White Paper, was issued
soon thereafter.
4.1.1. 1998 U.S. WhitePaper
In June 1998, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued the
Clinton administration's revised domain name policy statement,
commonly known as the White Paper.' Essentially, the White Paper
called for privatization of the management of Internet names and ad-
dresses. To facilitate increased global participation and competition,
the White Paper suggested that it was time for a new, private, non-
profit organization, independent of the U.S. Government, to organize
and administer the domain name system65 The increased conflicts
between trademarks and domain names and the need for new top-
60 Albert, supa note 58, at 794.61 See id at 795.
62 Luke A. Walker, Note, ICA NN's UifomDomin Nanm Dispute Resdtion Pd-
icy, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 289, 296 (2000).
63 Green Paper, supra note 57.
64 NAT'L TELEcOMM. AND INFO. ADMIN., DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 63 Fed. Reg.
31,741 (proposed June 10, 1998) [hereinafter White Paper].
65 Id 31,749-51. In addition to managing IP addresses and root servers, the
White Pa er called for the new organization to monitor protocol parameters and to
increase the number of top-level domains. Id
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level domain names were two specific issues that the White Paper
cited as reasons for a new domain name policy.66
Unlike the policy proposal that preceded it, the White Paper was
well received by the international Internet community because it ad-
hered to the spirit of the Internet Common Law. For example, the
White Paper explicitly outlined four guiding principles for the new
system of domain name management: (1) stability; (2) competition;
(3) private, bottom-up coordination; and (4) representation.67 Each of
these principles reflected important aspects of Internet norms and
culture. The recognition of private, bottom-up coordination is par-
ticularly significant since it is this appeal to populist authority that
most resembles the flexibility and dynamism of the Internet Common
Law. In the words of the White Paper, a "private coordinating proc-
ess is likely to be more flexible than government and to move rapidly
enough to meet the changing needs of the Internet and of Internet us-
ers. The private process should, as far as possible, reflect the bottom-
up governance that has characterized development of the Internet to
date."68
In a less explicit manner, the White Paper also recognized the im-
portance of private contracts for the Internet community. In regard
to trademark issues, the White Paper made several recommendations
as to how trademark and domain name disputes should be handled.
One of the most important recommendations was to use the registra-
tion contract as a method to bind parties to alternative dispute resolu-
tion procedures. The White Paper specifically recommended that the
new organization adopt policies whereby "[d]omain name registrants
would agree, at the time of registration or renewal, that in cases in-
volving cyberpiracy or cybersquatting (as opposed to conflicts be-
tween legitimate competing rights holders), they would submit to and
be bound by alternative dispute resolution systems.. . for the purpose
of resolving those conflicts."'
It has been this acknowledgment of private contracts and bottom-
up governance that has given the White Paper such significant influ-
ence over the development of ICANN and its Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy. Indeed, members of the Clinton
administration as well as denizens of the international Internet com-
66 Seeid 31,742.
67 Id 31,749.
68 Id
69 Id 31,750.
2000]
U. Pa... Int'I E con L.
munity hailed the White Paper as an example of Internet consensus
building!' This so-called Internet consensus could not, however,
have been transformed into institutional reality without the assistance
of some traditional international organization. The White Paper sug-
gested that the government would "[a]sk WIPO to convene an inter-
national process including individuals from the private sector and
government to develop a set of recommendations for trade-
mark/domain name dispute resolutions.... " WIPO responded to
this request by developing the backbone of what would become
ICANN's Policy.
4.1.2. The Cmw of ICA NN and tbe 1999 POFiaIRepot
In response to the White Paper recommendations, a group of
Internet associations came together in the late summer of 1998 to
form the new, private, non-profit corporation that would manage the
Internet domain name systemn That new corporation was ICANN.
At first, it was unclear what ICANN's responsibilities entailed. Con-
ferences were convened throughout the world, prior to the establish-
ment of ICANN, to discuss what the future of this new quasi-public
institution would be. Seveial issues were discussed at these interna-
tional conferences including board and membership composition,
Internet security and privacy, and the development of a new domain
name dispute resolution system7 3
In the end, the institutional structure of ICANN corresponds to
many aspects of the Internet's established norms and customs. 4 It is
ICANN's Policy, however, that resonates most with the Internet
Common Law. Adapted from a WIPO proposal, the ICANN Policy
70 See Deud in the Law- The Lawof Chntspa, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1577,
1669-70 (1999) [hereinafter Dezdopnx 7&]. However, the White Paper was not with-
out its critics. See gray Alyssa Katz, Star Spar ozer U.S. Net Plicy, Wired News,
([une 11, 1998) (reporting criticism of the White Paper by Harvard Professor Law-
rence Lessig), at http://www.wired.com/newvs/potics/0,1283,12931,00.html.
71 White Paper, supra note 64, at 31,751.
72 For a more detailed account of the formation of ICANN, see generally Deid.
qinrnts, sup"a note 70, at 1671-76 (describing ICANN's structure and purpose).
73 Id at 1672.
74 ICANN's bylaws display how the corporation is bound by transparent meas-
ure of decision-making, as policies and decisions by the board are required to be
posted on the Internet and are open to external comments. See BYLAWS FOR
INTERNET CORPORATION OF ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, art. III, at http://
www.icann.org/general/bylaws.htm (last modified July 16, 2000).
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was approved and implemented in the fall of 1999!. The WIPO pro-
posal was first prepared in response to the White Paper's request that
WIPO be involved in the development of an alternative dispute reso-
lution system. As one of the sixteen specialized agencies of the
United Nations system of organizations, WIPO is an intergovem-
mental organization that is responsible for promoting the protection
of intellectual property rights throughout the world. 6 WIPO operates
under the traditional paradigm of state-to-state cooperation in the
administration of multilateral treaties. It is thus highly ironic that this
intergovernmental organization is responsible for forging an altema-
five dispute resolution system that in many ways undermines the
authority of the same nation-states it is supposed to be coordinating.
From July 1998 to April 1999, WIPO undertook an extensive in-
ternational consultation process (WIPO's First Internet Domain
Name Process) that resulted in a Final Report containing recommen-
dations regarding trademark and domain name disputes." Taking its
cue from the White Paper, the WIPO Final Repoit called for an ex-
plicitly minimalist approach in addressing trademark and domain
name conflicts. Specifically, the Final Report recommended that
ICANN adopt a uniform dispute resolution policy that is limited in
scope "to cases of bad faith, abusive registration of domain names
that violate trademark rights.... ."8 Procedurally, the Final Report
recommended that ICANN's Policy be conducted online and that fi-
nal determinations be limited to orders canceling or transferring do-
main name registrations and allocating costs of the procedure against
the losing party. The Final Report also made recommendations re-
garding exclusions for famous and well-known marks and for ICANN
to expand the number of generic top-level domain names "in a slow
75 See Donmin Nanm Resdtion Serdce for gLTDs, at http://arbiter.
wipo.int/domains/gltd/indexhtml (last visited Sept. 12, 2000); s&- also Janet Kom-
blun, DorminNanrA =orda Step Cxer, CNET News, (Aug. 25, 1998) (discussing an
earlier proposal to create an international nonprofit corporation made up of repre-
sentatives from all parties interested in the domain naming process) at
http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-332578.html; Niall McKay, New Inernt
Goz-mrot Foag Wired, (Sept. 17, 1998) (explaining the problems arising from the
creation of the ICANN Policy, at ttp://www.wired.com/news/politics/
0,1283,14795,00 .html.
76 WIPO, What Is WIPO, at http://www.vwipo.org/eng/dgtext.htm (last visited
Sept. 12, 2000).
77 See WPO, Fnml Report of the W4PO Itrert Dormin Nane Prooes, WIPO Pub.
No. 92-805-0779-6, (Apr. 30, 1999), at http://wipo2.wipo.int/processl/report/final
report.html.
78 Id
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and controlled manner."79 By November 1999, many of the recom-
mendations contained in the WIPO Final Report were adopted by
ICANN, including a system of best practices for registration authori-
ties and an administrative system for resolving domain name and
trademark disputes."
WIPO's involvement with ICANN's Policy did not end with the
Final Report. WIPO's Arbitration and Mediation Center- a forum
established in 1994 to help reconcile international intellectual property
disputes- soon became the locus for implementing ICANN's Policy.
By December 1999, WIPO's Arbitration and Mediation Center began
providing dispute resolution services to give effect to ICANN's Pol-
icy." One day after ICANN's Policy was implemented, the first
trademark and domain name complaint was lodged with WIPO over
worldwrestlingfederation.com 2 As of September 19, 2000, over 1800
complaints have been filed with WIPO regarding generic top-level
domain names and 1099 cases have been decided or terminated. 3
4.2. KeyElan fICA NNs Pdliy
The growing number of cybersquatting complaints filed with
VIPO demonstrates how, in many ways, ICANN's Policy has ap-
pealed to the norms and customs of the Internet community. The
administrative procedures underlying ICANN's Policy, the use of pri-
vate contracts to implement the policy, and the enhanced efficiencies
of the resolution process are all examples of how ICANN has prop-
erly respected the fundamental norms of Internet culture.
79 Id The Final Report also recommended that improved registration practices,
such as collection of accurate and reliable contact information for dormin name
holders, be adopted by all registration authorities.
80 See ICANN, Tdiw for the Fomulation ari lrrpwmiation of the Unifom Domin
Nanm DisputResdution Pky, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-schedule.htm
(last visited Sept. 12, 2000).
81 SeeDonminNanmResdutionSeniceforgL TDs, supra note 75.
82 See World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v. Bosman, WIPO Case No. D99-
0001 (Jan. 14, 1999), aLdabe at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html
/d99-0001.html.
83 See ICANN, Srtmaad Sunmry P n Urger Uom Dispute Resdution
pdic (Sept. 28, 2000) at http://www.icann.org/uarp/proceedings-stat.htm. WPO
has also recently begun to provide mediation services for country code top-level
domain names. See WIPO, Dot Country Calfs Turn to WIPOfor Hdp in Resdcng Qber-
squatting Disputes, at http://arbiter.wipo.int/press/updatel06.htnI (last visited Sept.
28, 2000).
[Vol121:3
INT'L TRADEMARKDISPUTES
4.2.1. A drmistratizeoPma
Unlike the NSI dispute resolution policies, ICANN's Policy does
not hastily place a hold on domain names that are under dispute.
Rather, ICANN's Policy provides for a more balanced and flexible set
of administrative procedures. When a trademark owner files a com-
plaint with WIPO, or any of the other ICANN-approved dispute
resolution service providers,84 ICANN Policy requires WIPO to re-
view the complaint for compliance purposes and then forward the
complaint to the appropriate domain name holder. After receipt of
the complaint, the domain name holder has twenty days to file a re-
sponse. Once WIPO has received the domain name holder's reply, an
administrative panel of either one or three persons is convened. The
administrative panel will have fourteen days to analyze the case and
provide a decision to WIPO, at which time WIPO will notify both
parties and publish the full decision on a publicly available website.86
Ideally, the entire resolution is designed to cost approximately $1500
to $3000 and take less than fifty days to complete." After the decision
has been handed down, either party is free to dispute the administra-
tive panel's decision in a conventional court of appropriate jurisdic-
tion. Meanwhile, ICANN will refrain from implementing the panel's
decision until a judicial decision has been rendered.
84 WIPO is not the only international organization that has been approved by
ICANN to implement the UDNDRP. The other approved providers for the Uni-
form Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy are the National Arbitration Forun,
Disputes.org/eResolution Consortium, and the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolu-
tion. Se ICANN, APPROVED PROVIDERS FOR UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTrE
RESOLUnoN POLicY, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/approved-providers.htm (last
modified May21, 2000).
85 The administrative panel will consist of a single panelist, unless either party
to the dispute requests a three-member panel. ICANN, RuLES FOR UNIFORM
DOMAIN NAME DIsPurE RESOLUTION POLicy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/
udrp-rules-24oct99. htm, at 6(b)-(e) (last visited Sept. 14,2000).
86 Id at 15(b), 16(a)-(b).
87 WYPO Guide to the Unifonm Dormin Nane Dispute Rsdution Pdily, at
http://arbiter.ipo.int/domainsfguide/index.html, Overview of the Administrative
Procedure (last visited Sept. 13, 2000).
8s It is still unclear how conventional judicial bodies will view the administrative
decision rendered under ICANN's Policy. At least one US. federal court has stated
that courts are not bound by the administrative proceedings, although the court did
suggest that some degree of deference maybe granted to these panel decisions. See
Weber-Stephen Prods. Co. v. Armitage Hardwre & Bldg. Supply Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.
2d BNA 1766 (N.D. IlM. 2000); se also Victoria Slind-Flor, Cowrt o&f Pouer of
ICANN, NATL .J., May22, 2000, at B6 (reporting that courts are "not bound by
the administrative proceedings of the organization established to provide manage-
ment of the Intemet domain-name system").
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The ICANN Policy works best in those areas where it corre-
sponds with the underlying principles of the Internet Common Law.
For example, by limiting the dispute resolution process to the trade-
mark owner and the domain name holder, and removing the registrar
from the conflict, ICANN Policy supports the Internet's emphasis on
flexibility. Prior to the ICANN Policy, NSI found itself embroiled in
litigation that hindered its ability to continue to register domain names
and provide a predictable and stable environment for the growth of e-
commerce. ICANN's Policy is a more even-handed attempt to bal-
ance the rights of trademark owners and domain name holders.
Whereas NSI would presume trademark infringement and place on
hold the domain names involved in trademark litigation, ICANN's
Policy takes the more prudent step of refraining from changing the
status of domain names while expediting the resolution process. Fi-
nally, by providing registrars with best-practices guidelines on obtain-
ing accurate registration information, the ICANN Policy also provides
the stability and predictability necessary for the continued growth of
the Internet.
4.2.2. Restrants'Maratory Crent to A rbitration
In addition to providing increased flexibility and predictability,
ICANN's Policy also reinforces the Internet's reliance on private
contracting. The ICANN Policy has been adopted by all accredited
domain name registrars for those domain names ending in .com, .net,
.org, and a select few countrycode top-level domains. 9  ICANNs
Policy is automatically integrated into the domain name registration
agreements offered by these registrars.' Thus, when one seeks to
register a domain name with one of these accredited registrars, that
person consents to abide by ICANN's administrative dispute resolu-
tion system as part of her registration agreement. This mandatory
consent to arbitration uses the Internet's penchant for private con-
tracting to insure stability in the ICANN dispute resolution process.
All who want to participate in the mainstream of Internet association
must agree to participate in the administrative dispute resolution proc-
ess, while still retaining the right to take their dispute through con-
ventional litigation channels. The mandatory consent to administra-
89 See ICANN, UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY, at
http://www. icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm, Notes 2 (last visited Sept.
14,2000) [hereinafter ICANN POIICY].
90 Sw id Notes 3.
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tive proceedings also eliminates the registrar from any legal liability
and allows the dispute resolution process, as well as Internet growth,
to progress unabated.
4.2.3. InaasedEffidaeny
In contrast to conventional litigation, ICANN's Policy is perhaps
best suited for Internet culture because it places a premium on mone-
tary and time efficiency. The Internet is a dynamic technology that is
rapidly changing to meet the demands and needs of the cyberspace
community. As such, it requires a general and uniform process of
dispute resolution that can cultivate rather than hinder such change.
By decreasing transaction costs, and increasing resolution speed,
ICANN's Policy provides dynamic technology with a dynamic dispute
resolution process. Rather than tying up trademark and domain name
conflicts in protracted legal proceedings, ICANN's Policy offers an
alternative that is significantly less expensive for both parties and leads
to a quicker result. Consider, for instance, the first complaint filed
under the ICANN Policy with WIPO. In that case, the World Wres-
tling Federation, with relatively little expense compared to conven-
tional litigation costs, prevailed in having the domain name world-
wrestlingfederation.com transferred to it within forty days of filing the
complaint. Even the domain name holder, Michael Bosman, who was
forced to hand over the domain name, agreed that ICANN's Policy
was economically efficient and fair?1
The use of expert arbiters on administrative panels also makes
ICANN's Policy more efficient. Unlike most civil courts, methods of
alternative dispute resolution often rely on mediators that are well
versed in the details of particular types of conflicts. ICANN's domain
name dispute resolution system is no different. It relies on panelists
that are not only familiar with arbitration and alternative dispute
resolution, but have experience in the areas of intellectual property
law, e-commerce, and the Internet.' This added knowledge base sug-
gests that, at the very least, parties to a domain name conflict can ex-
pect a proficient arbiter to be presiding over their grievances.
91 Jeri (ausing, Wmding Gimp Win Ba& Use of Its Nam on Inter4 N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17,2000, at G4.
92 See WIPO, W[PO Dormin Nar Panelists, at http://arbiter.wipo.int/doma*is/
panel/index.htnl (last visited Sept. 13, 2000).
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4.3. Lirmitati cfICANN's Pdicy
While the JCANN Policy contains many elements that adhere to
Internet culture, including respect for private contracts, the need for
flexibility, and the appeal for efficiency, the policy also has its limita-
tions. First, because the ICANN Policy takes a self-avowed minimal-
ist approach towards trademark and domain name disputes, it does
not address the more difficult issues beyond cybersquatting. Second,
because ICANN's Policy deals only with trademarks that exist among
the top-level domain name registrars, there are other types of intel-
lectual property, and an entire swath of the Internet community, that
remains unaffected by ICANN's Policy. Third, on an empirical level,
ICANN's Policy seems to be reinforcing a bias towards large com-
mercial interests, namely those who already have trademarks regis-
tered.
4.3.1. Deals Only Wth A busiw Registratins
Since its origins in the U.S. White Paper and the WIPO Final Re-
port, ICANN's Policy has remained wedded to taking a minimalist
approach towards addressing the intersection of international intel-
lectual property and the Internet. ICANN's Policy focuses solely on
trademarks, to the exclusion of other intellectual property rights. It
deals only with the issue of bad faith trademark abuse, or cybersquat-
ting. Section four of ICANN's Policy explicitly states that three cu-
mulative conditions must be met in order for a complaint to be filed.
First, the domain name must be "identical or confusingly similar to a
trademark... in which the complainant has rights."93 Second, the
domain name holder must have "no rights or legitimate interests in
respect of the domain name."94 Third, the domain name must have
been registered and used in "bad faith."'
The focus on cybersquatting is commendable. By specifically tar-
geting cybersquatters, ICANN's Policy helps preserve the intuitive
functionality of the Internet. E-commerce and Internet use rely pri-
marily on the convenience of the World Wide Web. Hoarding do-
main names that are identical or similar to registered trademarks hin-
ders such convenience and intuitiveness. Cybersquatting prevents
trademark owners from exercising their intellectual property rights in a
new medium and misdirects online consumers to alternative sites.
93 ICANNPoLicy, stpra note 89, at 4(a)() .
94 Id at 4(a) (i).
95 Id at 4(a)(i).
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ICANN's Policy appropriately attacks such "bad faith" domain
name registration. However, it does not deal with the more complex
and troubling issue of legitimate competing trademark claims on the
Internet. As the Internet and e-commerce continue to develop across
international borders, the conflict between geographically bounded,
legitimate trademark rights will continue to pose legal problems. If
ICANN is to endure as an institution, it must address those problems
that cannot be so easily dismissed.
4.3.2. ICA NN's PoiyL icmi toReiste Traderwks
A second drawback of ICANN's Policy is its limited scope. Cur-
rently, ICANN's Policy has been designed to deal only with registered
trademarks found in the most ubiquitous top-level domain names-
the lucrative .com, .net, and .org domains. Cybersquatters, however,
have moved beyond registered trademarks to stake out other forms of
intellectual property on the Internet. Intellectual property, outside of
registered trademarks, such as geographical indications, trade names,
and personality rights associated with celebrity names, has become the
latest fodder for cyberpiracy.96 ICANN has thus far been able to deal'
with some of these issues, particularly the cybersquatting of celebrity
names, on an ad hoc basis. For example, a WIPO panel recently or-
dered the holder of the domain name juliaroberts.com to transfer the
domain name to the American actress.' If ICANN's Policy is to be-
come a stable, uniform method of resolving domain name disputes, it
must move beyond ad hoc solutions. This requires implementing a
corollary to its policy that deals with those intellectual property rights
outside of the traditional rubric of trademarks.
To their credit, ICANN and its supporting organizations, such as
WIPO, have recognized some of the limitations of the ICANN Policy.
Several member-states of WIPO, for example, have solicited WIPO to
embark upon a second round of international consultations to address
these unresolved issues, especially the protection of domain names
that are not registered trademarks. In response, WIPO commenced
the Second Internet Domain Name Process, a process identical to the
9 See John Hartje, Resdzing Intemet Donmin Nanr D/spzu, INTELL PROP.
TODAY, Aug. 2000, at 38.
97 See Charles Arthur, Juia RoA Regais the Right to Her Ozn Donuin INDEP.
(London), June 3, 2000, at 5.
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first set of consultations that produced the WIPO Final Report." The
organization is expected to issue a final report sometime in 2001"
4.3.3. Bias Tozezrd La7ge Conmrnidal ntersts
The third, and perhaps greatest, defect in ICANN's Policy is its
partiality toward the large commercial interests that often initiate the
domain name dispute resolution proceedings. As an empirical matter,
80% of the cases decided by WIPO's administrative panels have been
in favor of the complainant."° Furthermore, of the one thousand or
so cases that have gone before all four of the ICANN-approved arbi-
tration boards, 75% have been decided in favor of trademark hold-
ers.1"' On the one hand, the overwhelming success of trademark
owners can be viewed as a natural outcome of the ICANN Policy
structure. Since only abusive registrations can be challenged, and be-
cause only trademark owners can initiate proceedings, it would appear
natural that most hearings would be rather clear-cut decisions in favor
of those with existing property rights.
Nevertheless, the bias toward trademark owners may have far-
reaching and unsettling repercussions. Indeed, in those areas where
ICANN has attempted to move beyond or against the Internet cul-
ture, the quasi-public institution has come under fire from the Internet
community itself. Critics of ICANN have claimed, for example, that
the current structure of ICANN's Policy de-emphasizes free speech
concerns in favor of commercial interests." Critics fear that
ICANN's Policy may have a chilling effect on corporate criticism
websites. Disgruntled consumers and other individuals have been
using the Internet to voice their displeasure with some of the world's
largest multinational corporations. 0 Some technology experts worry
98 See WiPO to Probe Newlssues Relating to Donnin NanmA buee (uly 10, 2000), at
http://wipo2.wipo.int/process2/press/235.htm.
99 Id
100 See Dot Camtiy Codes Turn to WIPOfor Hdp in Resolwng Ceq D ipute,
(uly31, 2000), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/press/updatel06.htm.
101 See Laurie J. Flynn, Whxe Nane Is It A nyv.y? Arbitmtion Pards Fawtqinrg
Tradenmk Hddear in Disputes ozer Web Narz, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2000, at 0 ("In
the continuing battles between the owners of trademarks and individuals with Inter-
net domain addresses identical to them or nearly so, the trademark owners appear to
be far ahead.").
102 See id (citing James Love, director of the Consumer Project on Technology,
criticizing ICANN's Policy for being biased in favor of trademark holders).
103 See Carolyn Said, Dot-Cornplabis; Conas Learn the Hard Way that Crics ae
Taking Their Nam in Vain, S. CHRON., July 25, 2000, at Al (detailing that numer-
ous sites have arisen for the purpose of trashing well-known corporations).
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about whether ICANN's Policy favoritism may deter individuals from
taking on such corporate power or whether it will give the multina-
tional corporations the ability to acquire critical sites with relative ease
and little expense.
Besides the criticism of ICANN's Policy, commentators have also
been quick to assail ICANN's dilatory response to the call for ex-
panding the number of top-level domain names. ICANN's predeces-
sor, NSI, acknowledged the need to increase the number of top-level
domain names. NSI appeared to be aware that the artificial scarcity of
domain names created an unnecessary tyranny of the .com domains.
Entangled in many of the early trademark and domain name disputes,
NSI recognized that the tension between the multiple trademarks of
the tangible world and the uniqueness of the .com domain names
could be resolved by creating new top-level domains. Proposals were
circulated that would have relieved the pressures and demands for a
.com domain name. With an expanded number of generic top-level
domain names, multiple owners of identical marks could find suitable
Internet addresses. United Airlines could use united.air, while United
Van Lines could have rights to united.van. Both companies would
have adequate online exposure and consumers would be properly
guided to the company that offers the services they desire.
Despite the appeal of creating more domain name space, ICANN
appeared at first to be persuaded by trademark owners who argued
that increasing the number of domains would simply increase the pos-
sibility of consumer confusion.1 "4 Yet, if likelihood of confusion is the
proper litmus test for protecting trademarks, the idea of adding new
domain names should clarify rather than confuse the primary func-
tions of different companies and organizations. Will Internet users
really be confused between ford.car and ford.foundation? ICANN
initially seemed to agree that increasing domain names was a risky
proposition. However, at its most recent meeting, the organization
agreed to add approximately six new top-level domain names, but
without clarifying how many names would be phased in or what the
precise names would be.1°5
104 See graly INTA Repme to the U.S. Gownmnrt Paper on the Inwwrwn q
Tedical Mangwnt of Imet Nanze and Addreses, at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
ntiahome/domainname/130dftmail/scanned/INTA.htm (stating that INTA, an or-
ganization devoted to trademark protection, believes that where a trademark is un-
lawfuUy used as a domain name, there will be increased consumer confusion about
the source of the product or service offered on the Internet).
105 Associated Press, New Web Site Szukes Appnmro (July 16, 2000), at http://
news.cnet.com/nes/0-1005-200-2269908.html?tag =st.ne.1002srchres.ni.
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In addition to increasing the number of top-level domain names,
ICANN could also address its critics by correcting those aspects of its
dispute resolution policy that are contrary to the standards of the
Internet Common Law. ICANN's Policy could be reformed to in-
clude the democratic aspects of website communication. Populist
authority, embodied in the varieties of online consumer protests, is
one of the touchstones of the Internet Common Law. However,
ICANN's Policy currently does little to protect individuals who use
websites to parody or criticize trademark holders. Recall that
ICANN's Policy requires that a complainant must demonstrate that
the original domain name holder has "no rights or legitimate interests
in respect of the domain name."" 6 Without clarifying what consti-
tutes a "legitimate interest," ICANN's Policy leaves individual Inter-
net protesters vulnerable to the possibility of having their legitimately
expressive domain names taken from them. To address this issue,
ICANN could reform its Policy to specify that free speech qualifies as
a legitimate interest in a domain name.
5. CONCLUSION
As a case study of the Internet Common Law, ICANN's Policy
amply demonstrates how this quasi-public institution has struggled to
correspond with the customs and norms of Internet culture. In those
areas where ICANN's Policy meshes with the Internet Common Law,
ICANN appears to be a success. When the ICANN Policy defers to
the Internet community's desire for private contracts, as it does when
it requires mandatory consent to arbitration through the registration
process, ICANN's Policy is respected as a flexible and efficient
method of dispute resolution. Likewise, when ICANN's Policy at-
tempts to preserve the intuitive functionality of domain names by tar-
geting cybersquatters, the policy is hailed as a success. On the other
hand, when ICANN and its Policy try to do too much, such as when
they take on the role of the United Nations for the Internet or when
they appear to favor the commercial interests of trademark holders
over the free expression of individuals, the new organization is scruti-
nized as an undemocratic and unrepresentative coalition of special in-
terests.
For ICANN to endure as a lasting institution of Internet govern-
ance, it must come to recognize its connection to the Internet culture
that has given it shape. ICANN has evolved as a byproduct of the
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collision between geographically bounded trademark law and the lim-
itless reach of the Internet. This clash between the Internet and tradi-
tional notions of international trademark law has left a void- a void
that has been filled by an organic yet crude system of rules and regu-
lations that appeals to the private ordering and democratic decision-
making of the Internet community. Supplanting the conventional
methods of international dispute resolution, this new system of rules
and regulations has eschewed the traditional process of multilateral
treaty negotiations in favor of a more private bottom-up approach to
resolving online intellectual property conflicts.
In searching for the appropriate system of governance, the Inter-
net community has no need for an organization that seeks to control
or dictate the pace of technological change. What cyberspace partici-
pants yearn for instead is an organization that will guide them easily
and quickly through the growing pains of global Internet develop-
ment. Even the present tension between trademarks and domain
names may be a fleeting dilemma for such a sophisticated technologi-
cal age. It is not unrealistic to speculate that new technology may one
day resolve the conflict between domain names and trademarks once
and for all. There are already technologies under development that
would make it easier for an Internet user to find firns by their true
names, regardless of their domain name, further reducing confusion
between like-sounding domain names and diminishing the power of
trademarks as domain names.
Until such technology is implemented, however, it is up to the
Internet community to ensure that ICANN remains true to its roots
and that this new quasi-public creation remains attuned to the needs
of the community that it is meant to serve. For ultimately, ICANN's
Policy is not just about containing the risks of cybersquatting, it is
about developing an important, though perhaps transitory, institution
that can govern the resolution of international trademark disputes in
the Internet age.
2000].
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